This paper aims to shed light on the effect of a firm's geographic location on its over-investment by using different location variables based on a sample of 1936 Chinese listed firms spanning from 2007 to 2016. We find that remotely located firms have higher level of over-investment. Remotely located firms with more free cash flow face severer over-investment problem. In further research, we examine whether institutional investors can mitigate remote firms' over-investment. However, we find that institutional investors have no governance effect on remote firms' over-investment.
Introduction
Previous studies show that firm characteristics impact over-investment, however, they neglect a very obvious characteristic of firms: location. In remote areas, it is harder for investors to oversee listed firms, which deteriorates agency problems. Severe agency problems in remote firms impact firm's behavior. We consider firm's location has significant impact on over-investment according to the previous studies. In this paper, we examine the impact of location on firm over-investment and the influence of free cash flow on the impact of location on firm over-investment. Remotely located firms face severer information asymmetry and agency problems, which influences its cash holding decisions and financing capability (Boubaker et al, 1 ).
Richardson(2006)
2 argues free cash flow and financing constraint are responsible for firm's over-investment. Xinquan Yang and Yumei Fu 3 find firms located in non-center cities hold more cash and tend to invest more. These firms suffer high financing costs and financing constraint because big banks are usually unwilling to offer loans to them due to lack of information (Arena 4 ). Without enough external funds, remote firms attempt to maintain internal funds. Cheaper internal funds may lead to over-investment (Myers and Majluf, 5 1984 ).
Based on the above analysis, we find the routes that location influences over-investment: On one hand, remote firms face severer information asymmetry and agency problems. Managers or controlling shareholders are more likely to over -invest when regulation is limited by location. Free cash flow can intensify over-investment. On the other hand, financing constraint caused by information disadvantage of remotely located firms pushes these firms to maintain more internal funds, they invest more because of low cost. 
In this model, Overi indicates over-investment, Growth is proxied by sales revenue growth, Lev indicates leverage which is calculated by total debt divided by total assets. Cash indicates cash holdings computed as cash plus short-term investment or financial assets to trade divided by lagged assets, Age indicates the number of years from firms IPO, Size is natural log value of book value of total assets, Ret is the market adjusted return as in Huili Zhang and Zhengfei Lu(2012) 9 , Yeardummies and Industrydummies are dummy variables to control year effect and industry effect. Board indicates the ratio of independent directors in the board, Own indicates the ownership concentration measured by the percentage of shares held by the greatest shareholders, Roa indicates the return of assets, State is the state owned firms dummy. We use three proxies as location variables: Nonc, Noncp and Distance. If firm's registered location is not in center cities, Nonc equals 1and 0 otherwise. If firm's location is not in center provinces, Noncp equals 1and 0 otherwise. According to " blue book of urban competitiveness" and " the blue book of provincial competitiveness" in year 2015 published by Chinese Academy of Social Science, we choose top 20 cities as center cities and top 10 provinces including 3 municipalities as center provinces. Previous studies usually use cities to distinguish remote areas and center areas. However, we consider this standard ignores relation between cities. Some median cities or small cities also have strong economic power and high popularity because they are near center cities. Nevertheless, they are classified into remote areas. Cites in the same province have similar economic power, cultural development level and political development level. So, we also use province as another standard to distinguish remote areas. We gauge the distance of firm's location from the nearest center city as a metric of its location using the model from Coval and Moskowitz (1999) 10 .
For further research, we try to test the impact of free cash flow and institutional investors. We design model(2) and model(3). In model(2), Fcf indicates free cash flow computed as net cash flows from operating activities minus normal investment from model in Richardson(2006) . In model(3), Ins indicates the percentage of shares held by institutional investors.
Data
The initial samples encompass all listed firms in shanghai exchange and shenzhen exchange during [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] . Distance between firm's location and the nearest city is manually calculated, other data are from CSMAR database and RESSET database. We remove following samples: (1)Financial listed firms; (2)Firms issuing H or B shares; (3)ST or ST*samples; (4)Abnormal samples, such as assets less than 0; (5)Samples with missing data in key indicators. All constant variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile level.
Results and robustness checks 3.1 Results
Table1 shows the effect of location on over-investment. The t-Statistics is reported in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is denoted with ***, ** and * respectively, the same blew. The results show that the location variables are positively related to over-investment. It is obvious that firms located in non-center cities or non-center provinces have higher over-investment. The results also show that firms face more over-investment when they are far away from center cities. The findings provide evidence that remote firms face higher agency costs arising from additional hurdles in the regulation of managers and 11 . However, we find contrasting evidence in our study that institutional investors have an adverse effect on firm investment efficiency. Column (4), (5) and (6) 
Conclusions
We find that firms located in non-center cities or non-center provinces have greater over-investment. Over-investment increases when the distance between listed firms and nearest center city increases. Free cash flow can reinforce the impact of location on the over-investment. Institutional investors have no governance effect on the impact of location on over-investment, they even push over-investment into a higher level. Our results are robust to alternative model of estimating firm over-investment and to different ranges of samples. Further work could try to classify institutional investors into different kinds and test their impact on the effect of location on over-investment.
